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rule-based decisions, the jury may exercise its best judgments over who will live and
who will die.
So while the Supreme Court has approved discretion, it has approved discretion
only forjuries. It has said that juries play this important role; juries express the public
moral sense. This statute, in a very interesting way, in a way that I think has conflicting
benefits and costs, also allows a judge to express that discretion; or at least to express it
in one direction. That is, if a jury has decided to sentence an individual to death, a
judge or a panel of judges may say that is not an appropriate sentence for this
individual. For one reason or another, a judge or judges, in their wisdom, may decide
that death is not appropriate.
Does this mean that moral accuracy review is a bad idea? Not necessarily. As
someone who is deeply skeptical about the death penalty in the United States, it is
difficult for me to disapprove of opportunities for mercy, of opportunities for a
defendant not to receive the death penalty. And I think the Massachusetts
recommendations provide just such opportunities. For me a good death penalty statute
is one where the death penalty is difficult to impose and easy not to impose. That is, in
a good death penalty regime, there are many hurdles that must be cleared, and at any
point any one actor can say that death is not appropriate for this individual. This
provision strikes me, therefore, as an important development and one more opportunity
for mercy.
On the other hand, I read Furman. And I share with the three concurring justices in
that case a view that there are deep problems with discretion. Discretion may not
always be imposed fairly. Discretion permits personal biases to creep in. So, whether
your concern is with arbitrariness, randomness, or discrimination, allowing ajudge or
judges to exercise discretion, perhaps without opinion, without expressing reasons, is
deeply troubling. Yet, I share Professor Hoffmann's concerns that rules cannot be
enough here; that we don't want moral accuracy review to become a checklist. For
example, the United States Supreme Court, in the State Farm [Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)], decision last term, held that when punitive damages
exceed actual damages by a ratio of more than 10:1, that is presumptively
inappropriate and unconstitutional. And I'm sure that the judges that had decided all
those cases along the way to the result in State Farm must have looked at one another
and said: "Really? That's what we were doing in each of those cases? We were
creating a 10:1 ratio?"
So I share the concern that rules will appear miraculously and spontaneously from
the process of doing moral accuracy review, and that what is meant to be open-ended
review for fairness will become just another rule-bound procedure.
OPEN DISCUSSION
MEADE I'm not sure if there was an understanding that 33E review is
confined to sentencing issues. It's not. It's trial issues as well.
Now, I have some good news for Mr. Creason, and some bad
news for you, Professor Schornhorst. The First Circuit has held
that the Supreme Judicial Court's decision to review an
unpreserved claim, to determine whether a miscarriage ofjustice
has occurred, does not waive the procedural default issue-and I
agree with what you were talking about, Mr. Creason.
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Procedural default is a very important aspect of the state
criminal justice process. It's important to respect the rights of
states to correct their own errors and have an opportunity to see
those issues for the first time. And it's an important principal of
federalism.
In Coleman v. Thompson [501 U.S. 722 (1991)], I think Justice
O'Connor starts her opinion by saying this is a case about
federalism. And that's exactly what it is. I think that's the type
of respect that the First Circuit showed when they made that
decision.
More recently, on another aspect of 33E that I didn't discuss,
after you've had your front-loaded, substantive review, it's more
difficult for those who have been convicted of first-degree
murder to come back a second time. They have to ask
permission, basically, of a single Justice of the SJC for leave to
appeal denials of future motions for new trial. And they have to
raise issues that are new and substantial. That's a phrase right
out of the statute.
And the single Justice acts as a gatekeeper. And he or she
determines whether or not the issue raised in the motion for new
trial is new and substantial. And they're conjunctive
requirements. If he or she decides that they are not, that's it.
There is no appeal from the gatekeeper's denial. And a
determination that those issues are not new and substantial (or at
the very least, not new), the First Circuit has also determined, is
a procedural default of the rule. So, it's not as open-ended as
you may have thought.
Well, I just want to further clarify because some of the students
in the crowd may not understand the interaction of these
comments. What Mr. Meade just indicated is that exercising
substantive review, essentially without regard to procedural
default, in the state court system, is not necessarily going to
waive the right of a state to assert procedural default when the
case goes into the federal system. The recommendation, as
outlined-and this is something that Professor Schornhorst
noted and I just want to highlight it again-we do not propose,
or do not suggest, the elimination of procedural default entirely
in the state system, either. What we are saying is that the
substantive review of the case-that particular kind of special
review that we're all talking about--should be exercised without
regard to procedural default.
So in other words, the appellate court is supposed to look at the
merits of the case without regard to whether the defendant
defaulted some procedural issue or something like that.
HOFFMANN
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Mr. Meade also just pointed out that that's unlikely to trigger
additional habeas review, until and unless the habeas courts
adopt their own form of substantive review. The habeas courts,
of course, could themselves someday choose to exercise their
Eighth Amendment right to engage in substantive review as
well. And those who know me know that I wrote an article
suggesting exactly that in the Texas Law Review about four
years ago or so. [Joseph L. Hoffmann, Substance and Procedure
in Capital Cases: Why Federal Habeas Courts Should Review
the Merits of Every Death Sentence, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1771
(2000).] It actually was the genesis of the idea that eventually
led to the state-level Fundamental Justice Amendment in
Illinois.
These are very smart people on this panel, and they have got it
almost exactly right, in terms of what we on the Council thought
were some of the issues that grow out of these particular
recommendations. As both Mr. Moulton and Professor Kamin
quite accurately suggest, the kind of substantive appellate review
that we recommend in this Report is unlikely to develop into any
kind of common law of the death penalty. And that's the way we
wanted it. That was the deliberate choice that we made.
In our view, we did not think that this would necessarily mean
that whatever reduction of death sentences would occur would
be arbitrary. Because, after all, it's not as if the appellate judges
are going to exercise this authority by rolling dice or flipping
coins. They're not going to randomly select the cases they
reverse. It really comes down to the question of whether, in
general, such substantive decisions about the merits of a death
sentence are better made by legal rules or through the exercise
of sound discretion. And you hope it will be by sound discretion.
We chose the path outlined by Justice Harlan-it's a path that is
very much supported by what I think remains, to this day, the
most brilliant article I've ever read about the death penalty. The
article was published in the early 1980's, in the Supreme Court
Review, entitled Deregulating Death, by Bob Weisberg.
Professor Weisberg, no friend of the death penalty, nevertheless
acknowledged, in his view, the fact that using rules may not be
the best way to make these kinds of substantive decisions.
[Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV.
305.] We use rules to make procedural decisions all the time;
it's a given that procedural issues should be governed by rules.
Bob Weisberg made the same point in his article that Justice
Harlan made: that on the substantive death sentencing decision,
it's not at all apparent that you get better, less arbitrary results
from rules than you would get from sound discretion.
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And so, we chose that path in the way we outlined this
substantive review power. And everything you said about that
was, I think, exactly on the money.
What's interesting, though, is that Harlan and Weisberg were
both talking about decisionmaking by jurors.
They were. You're exactly right. We have now given juries a
kind of mixed message that says: "Well, you have discretion, but
we're guiding that discretion with something that looks like
rules-these aggravating and mitigating circumstances." And
there has been a lot of literature over the years about whether
that mixed message has, in fact, undermined the quality of
decision making by juries, because they're kind of in this
netherworld where it's neither one nor the other. But in any
event, we did make the deliberate choice that on the substantive
level, not the legal procedural level, this review would be done
discretionarily rather than by the development and application of
rules.
Professor Hoffmann, may I exercise emeritus professor
prerogative to address the students?
You absolutely may.
The importance of knowing and complying with procedural
rules cannot be overemphasized. And I hope you can take this
with you back to the classrooms and not fall asleep during these
procedural discussions. On August 20th of this year, just a few
weeks ago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided in the
case of Gregory Johnson v. Daniel McBride [381 F.3d 587 (7th
Cir. 2004)], that after exhausting state remedies, an application
for federal habeas corpus was dismissed because counsel filed
one day late, beyond the statute of limitations provided by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
The deadline was June 28th. Counsel filed her petition. Not
filed-put it in the mail on June 25th, ahead of the deadline. It
didn't reach the Court of Appeals Clerk's Office until the 29th
of June, one day late. Out of court. No federal habeas corpus
review. No issue preserved. Bang. Now, that's procedural
default with a vengeance, and it has nothing to do with accuracy.
Did she use the postal service?
Used the postal service.
That's ineffective assistance.
2005]
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SCHORNHORST Well, but that's another catch. Effective assistance of counsel is
not a constitutional guarantee in collateral proceedings.
"Tough," as we say in the Navy.
LEIPOLD I was just wondering, picking up on Mr. Moulton's point that it
-matters a lot who your judge is. Maybe this is best directed to
Mr. Meade. Is there some sense that this wide discretion to, in
particular, trial judges, is (a), something they want? And (b),
whether they want it or not, is it likely to influence which
judges?
And which people end up becoming trial judges as vacancies
occur? Might this become a sort of litmus, in other words?
Someone who opposes the death penalty in all circumstances,
there is no chance of becoming a trial judge in Massachusetts,
because if they get one of these cases, they know, "I have this
authority to just bounce it like that." And so the cases will never
get brought in the first place.
MEADE Well, I think, on the first part of your question, that I'm sure
there are a lot of trial judges in Massachusetts that would not
like to have that discretion. But I think there are even more that
would relish it. I think also, or I'll add also, that the Governor
doesn't impose litmus tests on judges. We have a rather
complicated judicial nominating process that people go through,
and a confirmation process through our Governor's Council,
which has seven people not of the Governor's party on it
currently. So there are good checks and balances in the system
to prevent those concerns from coming to life.
HOFFMANN Surely it must be the case, though, that if a death penalty were to
be reinstated in Massachusetts, surely it would be the case that
this would become a more relevant issue for both trial and
appellate judges in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I
mean, in terms of their careers and their profession.
POKORAK I think the Commission did not really take on and address many
critical questions about mitigating evidence. What are the
standards of proof'? Is this a weighing state or is it not a
weighing state? And in fact, if you think about it that way, then
what Professor Kamin says judges don't do, they actually are
doing in many jurisdictions.
So imagine that the Massachusetts statute says that a jury must
be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no mitigating
circumstance exists that calls for life rather than death. The
burden is on the state to win the weighing, if you will. Then all
you need really is sufficiency review. On the issue ofwhether or
not that burden of proof, and that weighing, has been met.
[Vol. 80:91
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And it's a prolife way of putting discretion, if you will, in a
narrowed way, back in the judge's hands to weigh that out. And
historically, before there was bifurcation, judges did this all the
time. So let's not pretend that it's never been done. If they saw a
mentally retarded defendant who went through a very quick trial
in a non-bifurcated way, they overturned death sentences. And I
imagine when people find things insufficient, or whatever
Indiana's view is, what they're really doing is saying there is
some problem here with the nature of the crime versus the
amount of mitigation and the type of mitigation.
I think you open up two very important points. One is that I
agree completely that, over the sweep of American capital
punishment history, judges have exercised substantive review
authority. The problem until fairly recently, in most states, is
that they've had to find ways to do it, because the path was not
open to them to simply say that's what they were doing.
Sometimes they were able to do it through sufficiency review. In
the earlier, discretionary system, they may have had many
different ways they could have accomplished this. In more
recent years, they've tended to have to do it by finding
procedural violations and saying that that was why they were
reversing, if in fact they felt that there was something
substantively wrong with the sentence.
Again, part of the deliberate choice that the Council made, and
that Illinois made with the FJA, was to open this up and give
judges this power explicitly, rather than have to have them try to
find an alternative path to do it. The other side, though, when
you say it should perhaps be done through sufficiency review, I
guess just speaking personally, I'm not sure that that would be
enough. Because we all know that sufficiency review tends to be
exercised under standards like: "Could any reasonable juror
have plausibly read this evidence arguably to be enough to meet
the standard of proof?" And I would argue that that would not
be a strong enough authority in the reviewing court. I want them
to be more free than that to say "Yes, there was legally sufficient
evidence here, but I nevertheless think that the jury simply made
a bad decision about that evidence."
I'm not sure sufficiency is really the right word, but we know
that Supreme Court says appellate courts can reweigh. That
would be absolutely constitutional.
Yes. And we did not say anything about the process of how
mitigation gets weighed, I think mostly because-well, I can't
speak for other members of the Council, but I think most of us
figured that was pretty much understood. That the way this
generally gets done is that all mitigation comes in, and then the
jury does weigh that against what they've already found (under
HOFFMANN
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our recommendation) at the guilt-innocence phase on the
aggravation side. We did not say anything about the standard,
but I can assure you it would be the highest standard used in any
jurisdiction.
If I could just echo that. There is a lot to be said for honesty.
Sometimes.
Sometimes. I would rather have appellate judges doing non-
comparative proportionality review than going out and looking
for procedural hooks on which to hang death penalty reversals.
This statute gives judges the power to do what they rarely have
the power to do, namely, to determine that the death sentence
ought not to be imposed on an individual, even in the absence of
any substantive errors.
I have read more of the California Supreme Court's death
penalty opinions, I think, than anyone has or should. And as you
read through those opinions you can see the courts doing exactly
what this statute lets them avoid. The Rose Bird Court
overturned 62 of 66 death sentences in the ten years it was in
office. And in some cases they really had to go looking for a
procedural hook on which they could hang the reversal of a
death sentence. I would rather have had that court say, "We are
exercising our discretionary power; we don't think the death
sentence was appropriate in this case and as a result, we are
overturning the jury's verdict." Again, there is something to be
said for honesty.
I just wanted to again remind everyone of what I said yesterday
about sanctions. If we look at Illinois, the case that I had, People
v. Jimerson [652 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1995)], where this man was
absolutely innocent, as were his three codefendants, and through
prosecutorial misconduct supporting perjury of a witness and
then supporting the witness to lie in court .... There was no
deal made. This man was convicted, as were his fellow
defendants. And to this day there have been no sanctions against
any prosecutor on that case.
And what they are saying in Illinois, the exonerated, is that
prosecutors would rather see us die than admit they are wrong.
So I think we have got to look at this. Not just with prosecutors,
but also with incompetent defense lawyers and judges who allow
people to practice before them who are drunk, incompetent,
racially biased. Let's take that with us. Because otherwise, we're
learning nothing.
Well, on that note, and with that recognition of the importance
of deterring the kind of misconduct that we would like to
discourage, I will call the conclusion of the public portion of this
conference. Thank you.
MURPHY
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